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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
This matter comes before the court on an appeal by 
Cornelius Ferguson, a/k/a Abdullah Tanzil Hameen, from 
the denial of relief in this habeas corpus case. We have 
considered each of Ferguson's contentions, and for the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the district court's order. 
 
In 1992, a Delaware state jury convicted Ferguson of two 
counts of first-degree murder as well as other charges 
resulting from a single homicide and robbery. After a 
penalty hearing, the jury unanimously found that the state 
established three aggravating circumstances beyond a 
reasonable doubt: (1) Ferguson previously had been 
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convicted of another murder or manslaughter or of a felony 
involving the use of, or threat of, force or violence upon 
another person, Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, S 4209(e)(i) (1995); 
(2) Ferguson committed the murder while engaged in the 
commission of, or attempt to commit, or flight after 
committing or attempting to commit any degree of robbery, 
id. S 4209(e)(j); and (3) Ferguson committed the murder for 
pecuniary gain, id. S 4209(e)(o). The jury also unanimously 
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances. 
 
The trial court then independently analyzed the evidence 
and reached the same conclusions, though it considered 
the robbery and pecuniary gain aggravators as one factor, 
and placed no independent weight on the pecuniary gain 
aggravator. App. at 138. In particular, the court concluded 
"that the mitigating factors proven by [Ferguson] have been 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence to be far 
outweighed by the callous nature of this crime, the fact that 
the murder took place during the attempted commission of 
a robbery, the fact that [Ferguson] had previously been 
convicted of a murder and an aggravated assault with a 
firearm, the fact that [Ferguson] has demonstrated a 
propensity for extremely violent activity every time he has 
been released from prison, and [Ferguson's] almost cavalier 
attitude toward the victim's death." Id. at 141. In 
accordance with Delaware law at the time of sentencing, 
the court imposed a death sentence for the first-degree 
murder convictions because it determined that the 
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the 
convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See Ferguson v. 
State, 642 A.2d 772 (Del. 1994) (en banc). 
 
Thereafter, Ferguson filed an unsuccessful petition for 
post-conviction relief in the Delaware Superior Court, see 
State v. Ferguson, 1995 WL 413269 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 7, 
1995), and on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed its denial. See Ferguson v. State, 676 A.2d 902 
(Del. 1995) (table). He then filed his unsuccessful habeas 
corpus petition in the district court, leading to this appeal. 
See Ferguson v. State, 1996 WL 1056727 (D. Del. Dec. 13, 
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1996). We are concerned on this appeal only with 
sentencing issues. 
 
The Supreme Court of Delaware set forth the facts of the 
case as follows: 
 
        The record reflects that Ferguson shot and killed 
       Troy Hodges (`Hodges'). The homicide took place on the 
       night of August 5, 1991, in the parking lot of the Tri- 
       State Mall (the `Mall') in Claymont, Delaware. Ferguson 
       was accompanied by Tyrone Hyland (`Hyland'). 
 
        Both Ferguson and Hyland lived in Chester, 
       Pennsylvania. Hodges, who was apparently a drug 
       dealer living in Wilmington, had negotiated to purchase 
       a half-kilogram of cocaine for $10,000 either directly 
       from Hyland or from a third party, with Hyland acting 
       as middleman. Hodges arranged to meet Hyland at the 
       Mall. 
 
        Hodges had a friend, Alvin Wiggins (`Wiggins'), 
       accompany him to the Mall. Wiggins was seventeen 
       years old at the time of these events. Wiggins was also 
       apparently a drug dealer. Wiggins testified at 
       Ferguson's trial. 
 
        According to Wiggins, before they drove to the Mall, 
       Hodges gave Wiggins a plastic bag holding two smaller 
       packages, each of which contained $5,000 in cash. 
       They then drove to the Mall and parked in the lower 
       lot. Wiggins testified that after they arrived at the Mall, 
       Hodges took one of the two packages of money and 
       instructed him to stay in his car until he received a 
       sign from Hodges or until he returned. 
 
        Hodges then left and entered a passageway leading to 
       the upper parking lot of the Mall. Hodges was no longer 
       visible to Wiggins. Wiggins waited for Hodges for 
       approximately ninety minutes. During that time, he 
       unsuccessfully attempted to contact Hodges via his 
       `beeper.' When Wiggins learned that someone had been 
       shot at the Mall, he drove away. 
 
        Ferguson gave a tape recorded statement to the 
       Delaware State Police on September 26, 1991. It was 
       admitted into evidence at trial during the State's case- 
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       in-chief. In his statement, Ferguson admitted that he 
       was a passenger in a car driven by Hyland to the Mall 
       on the night of August 5, 1991. Ferguson stated that 
       he was sitting in the back seat of the car. 
 
        According to Ferguson, when they arrived at the 
       Mall, Hyland parked the car. Hodges got into the front 
       passenger seat of the car. Hyland and Hodges then 
       argued about money and drugs. According to 
       Ferguson, Hyland then clandestinely gave him a gun. 
       Ferguson stated that the gun was already cocked when 
       he received it. Ferguson pointed the gun at Hodges. 
 
        Hyland and Hodges continued to argue. Ferguson 
       stated that although the car was moving slowly 
       towards the Mall, Hodges opened the car door and tried 
       to leave the car. According to Ferguson, Hodges then 
       slapped at the gun, causing it to `accidentally'fire a 
       single shot. Ferguson claimed that he did not know 
       Hodges had been wounded and died, until days later. 
 
        Stewart Cohen (`Cohen') testified that on the night of 
       August 5, 1991, he was in the parking lot of the 
       K-Mart at the Tri-State Mall. Cohen stated that he 
       heard a `popping sound.' Cohen turned and saw a blue 
       Chevrolet Cavalier moving slowly in the parking lot. 
       Cohen stated that he saw a person shoved or jumping 
       out of the car. Cohen testified that this person then 
       ran towards him and collapsed on the sidewalk. 
 
        An autopsy revealed that Hodges died of massive 
       hemorrhaging due to a single gunshot wound. The 
       record reflects that the bullet, which was fired from 
       behind, entered his left side and travelled through his 
       body in an upward trajectory. The hole in Hodges' shirt 
       and the wound in his torso indicated that the muzzle 
       of the gun had been pressed against Hodges' body 
       when the shot was fired. 
 
Ferguson v. State, 642 A.2d at 775-76 (footnotes omitted). 
The Supreme Court of Delaware also noted that the gun 
used in the shooting belonged to Ferguson. Id.  at 776 n.4. 
 
The critical issue on this appeal is attributable to the 
trial court's having sentenced Ferguson under Delaware's 
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capital sentencing statute as amended effective November 
4, 1991, even though Ferguson murdered Hodges on 
August 5, 1991. The court employed the amended law as by 
its terms it applies "to all defendants tried or sentenced 
after its effective date." 68 Del. Laws ch.189,S 6 (1991). 
Ferguson contends that inasmuch as the Delaware 
legislature enacted the amendments after he murdered 
Hodges, use of the amended law violated the Ex Post Facto 
Clause of the United States Constitution. 
 
Obviously, it is important in resolving the ex post facto 
issue that we carefully consider the provisions of the capital 
provisions both at the time of the offense and the time of 
the sentencing, for if the amended law did not make 
significant changes in the sentencing process, there hardly 
could be an ex post facto problem. At the time that 
Ferguson committed his offenses, in a Delaware capital 
case the jury determined the sentence, and it could impose 
a death sentence only if it unanimously found at least one 
statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and concluded, after weighing the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, that it should impose a death 
sentence. Nevertheless, the statute did not require the jury 
to impose a death sentence if the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors. In addition, although the 
court instructed the jury as to the types of things that it 
could take into account in making its decision, the statute 
placed no limitations on what the jury could consider. 
 
The amended law changed the foregoing procedure, and 
the Delaware Supreme Court describes its capital 
sentencing provision as follows: 
 
       Under Delaware law, as revised in 1991, a sentence of 
       death may be imposed only under the bifurcated 
       procedure prescribed by 11 Del. C. S 4209. That 
       statute requires the jury to determine, during the 
       penalty phase, (1) whether the evidence shows beyond 
       a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one 
       statutory aggravating circumstance and (2) whether, by 
       a preponderance of the evidence, the aggravating 
       circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances 
       found to exist. 11 Del. C. S 4209(c). The trial court, 
       after considering the recommendation of the jury, is to 
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       decide the same questions. If the court concludes that 
       the answer to both questions is in the affirmative, it 
       must impose a sentence of death; otherwise, it must 
       impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the 
       possibility of probation, parole, or other reduction in 
       sentence. 11 Del. C. S 4209(d). Thus, the Superior 
       Court bears the ultimate responsibility for imposition 
       of the death sentence while the jury acts in an advisory 
       capacity `as the conscience of the community.' State v. 
       Cohen, Del. Supr., 604 A.2d 846, 856 (1992). 
 
Wright v. State, 633 A.2d 329, 335 (Del. 1993). 
 
The trial court in its "Findings After Penalty Hearing" at 
the trial summarized the essential differences between the 
law in effect on the date of Ferguson's offenses and the 
amended law it applied at his sentencing: 
 
       [U]nlike a jury under the old law, this Court, under the 
       new law, may consider only whether or not aggravating 
       factors outweigh mitigating factors. The Court may not 
       in unfettered discretion refuse to impose a sentence of 
       death where aggravating factors are proven and found 
       to be of substantial weight and mitigating factors are 
       found to be of less weight. The Court may not consider, 
       in reaching its decision, mercy, societal concerns, 
       proportionality of the sentence to other sentences 
       imposed for Murder First Degree in other cases, or any 
       other issues not specifically pertaining to `the 
       particular circumstances or details of the offense[or] 
       . . . the character and propensities of the offender. . . .' 
       These factors most likely were considered by and may 
       have influenced the jury or individual jury members in 
       their decision under the prior statute to recommend or 
       fail to recommend death. Under that law, the jury 
       clearly acted as `the conscience of the community' and 
       could in its unfettered discretion recommend life as the 
       appropriate punishment for the crime and offender 
       even though it had found the aggravating factors to 
       outweigh the mitigating factors. 
 
App. at 129-30 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted). 
 
Ferguson argued in state court that application of the 
amended sentencing statute in his case violated the Ex Post 
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Facto Clause because it eliminated the jury's unfettered 
discretion to impose a life sentence even though it may 
have determined that aggravating circumstances 
outweighed mitigating circumstances, and instead required 
the court to impose a death sentence if it made that same 
finding. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected Ferguson's 
ex post facto claim as "without merit," citing the following 
reasons for its decision: 
 
       This Court has previously held that `the changes 
       effected by Delaware's new death penalty statute are 
       procedural,' because the 1991 amendments `merely 
       alter[ed] the method of determining imposition of the 
       death penalty. The quantum of punishment for the 
       crime of first-degree murder in Delaware remains 
       unchanged.' State v. Cohen, Del. Supr., 604 A.2d 846, 
       853 (1992). See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293- 
       94, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). 
       The restrictive nature of the advisory jury's findings 
       and the mandatory imposition of the death penalty by 
       the sentencing judge under the amended statute are 
       likewise `procedural,' and therefore do not implicate ex 
       post facto concerns. See State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d at 
       849, 853-54. 
 
        Ferguson `has cited no legal precedent or intervening 
       changes in the law that would undermine the ratio 
       decidendi of this Court's holding in Cohen on the ex 
       post facto issue.' Dawson v. State, Del.Supr., 637 A.2d 
       57, 61 (1994). Accordingly, we decline to overrule 
       Cohen. We adhere to our ex post facto holding in that 
       decision and its progeny. Accord Gattis v. State , Del. 
       Supr., 637 A.2d 808, 821 (1994); Wright v. State , Del. 
       Supr., 633 A.2d 329, 343 (1993); Red Dog v. State, Del. 
       Supr., 616 A.2d 298, 305-06 (1992). 
 
Ferguson v. State, 642 A.2d at 783. In Dawson, Gattis, 
Wright and Red Dog, the Delaware Supreme Court similarly 
adhered to, and did not expand upon, its analysis in State 
v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846 (Del. 1992). 
 
In view of the Delaware court's reliance in Cohen on 
Ferguson's appeal, we now describe its ruling in Cohen, 
though we will return to it later in this opinion after we 
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consider the germane United States Supreme Court 
opinions. In Cohen, the Delaware court largely relied on 
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290 (1977), 
which it cited for the proposition that, " `[e]ven though it 
may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, a procedural 
change [in the law] is not ex post facto.' " 604 A.2d at 853 
(quoting Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293, 97 S.Ct. at 2298) 
(second alteration in original). Dobbert was concerned with 
a change in the sentencing process which, as is the case in 
the amended Delaware sentencing law at issue here, 
modified the functions of the court and jury. The Delaware 
Supreme Court found that Dobbert was " `[t]he case most 
analogous to the issue here. . . ." Id. It observed that the 
death penalty statute under challenge in Dobbert  " `simply 
altered the methods employed in determining whether the 
death penalty was to be imposed; there was no change in 
the quantum of punishment attached to the crime.' . . . 
That is precisely the issue before us." 604 A.2d at 853 
(citation omitted). It concluded that, 
 
       [g]iven the teaching in Dobbert, it is clear that the 
       changes effected by Delaware's new death penalty 
       statute are procedural. The revisions in the new law, 
       like those in Dobbert, merely alter the method of 
       determining imposition of the death penalty. The 
       quantum of punishment for the crime of first-degree 
       murder in Delaware remains unchanged. 
 
Id. 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court also held in Cohen  that its 
"conclusions regarding the defendants' ex post facto claims 
are buttressed by the recent case of Collins v. Youngblood, 
497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)." Id. at 
854. It noted that Collins overruled the ex post facto 
analysis in Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443 
(1883), and Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 18 S.Ct. 620 
(1898), leading the Delaware court to infer that,"by 
rejecting Kring and Thompson, it is now beyond 
peradventure that under Collins the new law survives an ex 
post facto analysis." Id. at 854. The Delaware court 
explained that "it is apparent that the new law does not 
involve `a right that has anything to do with the definition 
of crimes, defenses, or punishments, which is the concern 
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of the Ex Post Facto Clause.' " Id. (quoting Collins, 497 U.S. 
at 51, 110 S. Ct. at 2724). 
 
In Cohen the Delaware court concluded that"procedural 
statutes which merely act to the disadvantage of those 
affected by their enactment are not prohibited as ex post 
facto laws." Id. The Delaware court rejected the defendants' 
reliance in Cohen on Miller v. Florida , 482 U.S. 423, 107 
S.Ct. 2446 (1987), a case involving retroactive changes in 
sentencing guidelines, as it distinguished Miller on the 
ground that in Miller "the retroactive application of revised 
sentencing guidelines . . . increased the quantum of a 
defendant's punishment-- an effect manifestly prohibited 
by the Ex Post Facto Clause." Cohen, 604 A.2d at 854 
(citing Miller, 482 U.S. at 433-34, 107 S.Ct. at 2453). The 
Delaware Supreme Court believed that the changes brought 
by the new sentencing process did not make a comparable 
increase in the quantum of sentence. 
 
Finally, the court in Cohen rejected the defendants' 
reliance on Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 57 S.Ct. 
797 (1937), and State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761, 768-69 
(Del. 1973). Lindsey invalidated the use on ex post facto 
grounds of a new law that required the imposition of a 
sentence which under earlier law had not been mandatory. 
Dickerson relied on Lindsey to hold that a newly adopted 
mandatory death penalty provision in the Delaware murder 
statute could not be applied retroactively. See Cohen, 604 
A.2d at 855. The defendants in Cohen argued that the 
November 4, 1991 changes in the Delaware law were 
substantive and not merely procedural because "the new 
law . . . makes mandatory a sentence, which under the 
prior law, was discretionary, and . . . eliminates the 
unanimous jury requirement thus making a death sentence 
more likely." Id. at 855. 
 
The Delaware court rejected that argument as "predicated 
upon a flawed interpretation of what is meant by a 
mandatory sentence." Id. The court observed that, under 
Lindsey and Dickerson, the retroactive application of a 
statute to make mandatory what was only the maximum 
sentence at the time of the offense violated the Ex Post 
Facto Clause. But the court ruled that Delaware's amended 
law "is not `mandatory' [in the Lindsey  sense because] 
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imposition of the death penalty is based upon the predicate 
factual findings made by the jury and trial judge as to 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The existence of 
such factors and their relative weight, although ultimately 
determined by the trial judge, do not mandate a death 
sentence unless the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances. Thus, the new law is not 
`impermissibly mandatory.' " Id. The court cited Walton v. 
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 651-52, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3056 
(1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306-07, 
110 S.Ct. 1078, 1083 (1990); Boyde v. California , 494 U.S. 
370, 374, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1194-95 (1990); and Proffitt v. 
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260-61, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2970 (1976), 
in support of this conclusion. The court concluded that, 
"[b]y ignoring the weighing process, a crucial and 
constitutionally required step under the new law, the 
[defendants] demonstrate[ ] the weakness of [their] 
argument. The sentencing process remains basically 
discretionary, merely shifting the ultimate decision from the 
jury to the trial judge." Id. 
 
On June 13, 1996, after his unsuccessful post-conviction 
relief proceedings in the state courts, Fergusonfiled his 
habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254 in the district 
court. The district court granted a stay and appointed 
counsel. On December 13, 1996, the district court, without 
holding an evidentiary hearing but after entertaining oral 
argument, denied the petition in a comprehensive opinion 
and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. See 
Ferguson v. State, 1996 WL 1056727, at *28. 
 
Ferguson then appealed. We granted a certificate of 
appealability and, pursuant to the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214, 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(3), directed the parties 
to address the following issues: 
 
        (1) What deference, if any, must this Court gi ve to 
       the Delaware court's conclusions and applications of 
       law? See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e); 
 
        (2) Whether application of Delaware's amended death 
       penalty statute is a violation of the Ex Post Facto 
       Clause?; and 
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        (3)(a) Whether the aggravating factors of pecu niary 
       gain and robbery are duplicative and violative of the 
       Eighth Amendment?; and 
 
        (b) Whether the state court's review of this c laim for 
       plain error indicates that it is not an independent and 
       adequate state ground barring federal review? 
 
Insofar as we review the opinion of the district court we 
exercise plenary review on this appeal. See Hartey v. 
Vaughn, 186 F.3d 367, 371 (3d Cir. 1999). We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Application of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
       Penalty Act 
 
As we have indicated, our certificate of appealability 
included a question of the scope of the AEDPA which is 
applicable in this action as Ferguson initiated the habeas 
proceeding after the effective date of the AEDPA. See Hartey 
v. Vaughn, 186 F.3d at 371. Subsequently, after we issued 
the certificate of appealability, we addressed this issue in 
Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 880 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(en banc). Since then, however, the Supreme Court has 
decided the same issue in Williams v. Taylor, 68 U.S.L.W. 
4263 (U.S. Apr. 18, 2000). Accordingly, we will apply that 
case without making our own determination on the issue 
regarding the effect of the AEDPA. 
 
Williams v. Taylor construed the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(d)(1), which, as germane here in a case concerning 
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
court, provides that "with respect to any claim that was 
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted 
unless the adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision 
that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 
The Court in Williams v. Taylor held that"[u]nder the 
`contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the 
writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to 
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that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law 
or if the state court decides a case differently than [the 
Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable 
facts." Id. at 4277. Williams v. Taylor further held that 
"[u]nder the `unreasonable application' clause, a federal 
habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies 
the correct legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's 
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the 
facts of the prisoner's case." Id. The"unreasonable 
application" inquiry requires the habeas court to"ask 
whether the state court's application of clearly established 
federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id . at 4276. 
Thus, under the "unreasonable application" clause, "a 
federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because 
that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 
relevant state-court decision applied clearly established 
federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that 
application must also be unreasonable." Id . at 4277. The 
Court in Williams v. Taylor made it clear that the "contrary 
to" and "unreasonable application" clauses have 
independent meaning. Id. at 4275. 
 
B. The Ex Post Facto Clause Issue 
 
(a) Supreme Court cases 
 
Inasmuch as our obligation under the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(d), as construed by the Supreme Court in Williams 
v. Taylor, is to determine whether the Delaware court's 
decisions in Cohen and Ferguson, were "contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States," we must make an analysis of the Supreme 
Court's opinions and then consider the Delaware law and 
the Delaware Supreme Court's decisions within that 
analysis. Our starting point naturally is Article I,S 10 of the 
Constitution which provides that "[n]o State shall . . . pass 
any . . . ex post facto Law." Shortly after the Constitution 
was ratified, the Supreme Court identified four categories of 
penal laws that implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the 
third one of which was "[e]very law that changes the 
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the 
law annexed to the crime, when committed." Calder v. Bull, 
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3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). It is this category 
which Ferguson claims is implicated here. See br. at 21. 
 
More than a century later, the Court reaffirmed the 
Calder v. Bull principle by holding that a law is ex post 
facto if it "makes more burdensome the punishment for a 
crime, after its commission[.]" Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 
167, 169, 46 S.Ct. 68 (1925). The Court continues to 
adhere to that principle, see Lynce v. Mathis , 519 U.S. 433, 
440-41, 117 S.Ct. 891, 895-96 (1997), and indeed"[t]he 
bulk of [the Supreme Court's] ex post facto jurisprudence 
has involved claims that a law has inflicted `a greater 
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when 
committed.' " Id. at 441, 117 S.Ct. at 895 (quoting Calder v. 
Bull, 3 Dall. at 390). Such laws are prohibited because they 
"implicate the central concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause: 
`the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the 
legislature increases punishment beyond what was 
prescribed when the crime was consummated.' " Id., 117 
S.Ct. at 896 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30, 
101 S.Ct. 960, 965 (1981)). 
 
In Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, the 
case on which the Delaware Supreme Court principally 
relied in Cohen, the Court considered an ex post facto 
challenge to a statute that changed "the function of the 
judge and jury in the imposition of death sentences in 
Florida between the time [Dobbert] committed the acts 
charged and the time he was tried for them." Id. at 287, 97 
S.Ct. at 2295. At the time of Dobbert's offense, Florida law 
required the jury to impose a death sentence forfirst-degree 
murder, "unless the verdict included a recommendation of 
mercy by a majority of the jury." Id. at 288 & n.3, 97 S.Ct. 
at 2296 & n.3. But at the time of his sentencing, a new law 
which Florida enacted after the Florida Supreme Court 
invalidated its prior capital law as unconstitutional under 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972), 
provided that, after a murder conviction, there must be a 
separate sentencing hearing before the court and jury. See 
id. at 290, 97 S.Ct. at 2297. The new law required the jury 
to consider the aggravating and mitigating factors and 
render a non-binding advisory decision. See id.  at 291, 97 
S.Ct at 2297. The trial court then would weigh the same 
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evidence and, in its discretion, impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment or death. See id., 97 S.Ct. at 2297. 
 
A majority of the jurors at Dobbert's trial, after 
considering the aggravating and mitigating factors, 
recommended life imprisonment. Nevertheless, the trial 
court rejected that recommendation and imposed a death 
sentence. Dobbert argued that application of the amended 
Florida statute constituted an ex post facto violation 
because it deprived him of "a substantial right to have the 
jury determine, without review by the trial judge, whether 
[the death penalty] should be imposed." Id. at 292, 97 S.Ct. 
at 2298. 
 
The Supreme Court rejected that argument, ruling that 
"[t]he new statute simply altered the methods employed in 
determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed; 
[thus] there was no change in the quantum of punishment 
attached to the crime." Id. at 293-94, 97 S.Ct. at 2298. The 
Court explained that "[i]t is axiomatic that for a law to be 
ex post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law." 
Id. at 294, 97 S.Ct. at 2299. Specifically, to violate the Ex 
Post Facto Clause, the law must cause a "change in the 
quantum of punishment attached to the crime." Id., 97 
S.Ct. at 2298. Therefore, "[e]ven though[a new law] may 
work to the disadvantage of a defendant [as it did in 
Dobbert ], a procedural change is not ex post facto." Id. at 
293, 97 S.Ct. at 2298. The Court found that Florida's new 
law, insofar as it had no substantive effect on the range of 
sentences, i.e., life imprisonment or death for first-degree 
murder, did not change the quantum of punishment 
prescribed for the offense. Accordingly, the changes in the 
law were "merely procedural" and not ex post facto.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Court also explained in Dobbert that a law is not ex post facto if 
it is "ameliorative," i.e., when "viewing the totality of the procedural 
changes wrought by the new statute, . . . the new statute did not work 
an onerous application of an ex post facto change in the law" because it 
afforded the defendant more safeguards or protections than the law in 
place at the time the offense was committed. See Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 
296-97, 97 S.Ct. at 2300. The Delaware Supreme Court did not 
determine in Cohen or Ferguson whether the amended Delaware law was 
ameliorative; instead, it rejected the ex post facto challenge solely on 
the 
alternative ground that the changes enacted were"merely procedural." 
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Subsequently, in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 
S.Ct. 960, the Court considered a situation in which a 
Florida trial court sentenced the petitioner to 15 years in 
prison for second-degree murder at a time when a Florida 
law provided for mandatory reductions in the term of 
imprisonment based on "gain-time credits" earned through 
compliance with prison regulations. The legislature later 
amended the law to reduce the number of gain-time credits 
available to prisoners, thereby postponing the date when 
they would become eligible for early release. The Supreme 
Court held that application of the amended statute to the 
petitioner was an ex post facto violation because"the new 
provision constricts the inmate's opportunity to earn early 
release, and thereby makes more onerous the punishment 
for crimes committed before its enactment." Id. at 35-36, 
101 S.Ct. at 968. 
 
The Court identified in Weaver the "two critical elements" 
of an ex post facto law: "it must be retrospective . . . and 
it must disadvantage the offender affected by it." Id. at 29, 
101 S.Ct. at 964. The Court noted that it also had held that 
there was not an "ex post facto violation . . . if the change 
effected is merely procedural, and does `not increase the 
punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or 
the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.' " Id. at 29 
n.12, 101 S.Ct. at 964 n.12 (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 
574, 590, 4 S.Ct. 202, 210 (1884), and citing Dobbert, 432 
U.S. at 293, 97 S.Ct. at 2298). The Court explained, 
however, that "[a]lteration of a substantial right . . . is not 
merely procedural, even if the statute takes a seemingly 
procedural form." Id., 101 S.Ct. at 964 n.12 (citing 
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. at 354-55, 18 S.Ct. at 624, and 
Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. at 232, 2 S.Ct. at 452). The 
Court found that application of the amended gain time law 
in Weaver was an ex post facto violation because it 
"disadvantaged" the petitioner by making the punishment 
for his offense "more onerous" than the punishment 
prescribed at the time of the offense. The Court rejected the 
state's attempt to characterize the new law as "merely 
procedural," ruling that "the new provision reduces the 
quantity of gain time automatically available, and does not 
merely alter procedures for its allocation." Id. at 36 n.21, 
101 S.Ct. at 968 n.21. 
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The Court also observed in Weaver that "a law may be 
retrospective not only if it alters the length of the sentence, 
but also if it changes the maximum sentence from 
discretionary to mandatory." Id. at 32 n.17, 101 S.Ct. at 
966 n.17 (citing Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. at 401, 57 
S.Ct. at 799). The Court reached this conclusion because 
"[t]he critical question . . . is whether the new provision 
imposes greater punishment after commission of the 
offense, not merely whether it increases a criminal 
sentence." Id. (citations omitted). 
 
The Court's decision in Lindsey v. Washington  exemplifies 
this principle. In Lindsey the Court ruled that a law is ex 
post facto if its effect "is to make mandatory what was 
before only the maximum sentence." 301 U.S. at 400, 57 
S.Ct. at 798-99. At the time of the petitioners' grand 
larceny offenses in Lindsey, they had been subject to a 
statutory minimum sentence of six months to five years 
and a maximum sentence of not more than 15 years, with 
the court required to impose an indeterminate sentence up 
to whatever maximum it selected, but not to exceed 15 
years. See id. at 398, 57 S.Ct. at 797. But the legislature 
amended the law before the petitioners' sentencing so that 
the court was required to impose a 15-year sentence and a 
defendant could obtain earlier release only through the 
grace of the parole board. See id. at 398-99, 57 S.Ct. at 
798. The trial court imposed sentence under the new law. 
 
In finding an ex post facto violation in Lindsey, the Court 
held that "the measure of punishment prescribed by the 
later statute is more severe than that of the earlier." Id. at 
401, 57 S.Ct. at 799. Specifically, although a sentence of 15 
years had been permissible under the law at the time of the 
offenses, 15 years became the only sentence that the court 
could impose under the new law. Moreover, the new law 
eliminated the trial court's discretion to impose a shortened 
sentence. Thus, the Court held that the new law imposed a 
more severe punishment after commission of the offense, 
and violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.2  In Miller v. Florida, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, effectively 
overruled the aspect of the Court's decision in Lindsey that the law was 
ex post facto merely because it worked to the detriment or "substantial 
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482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, the Court ruled that a 
revision in Florida's sentencing guidelines which became 
effective between the date of the petitioner's offense and the 
date of his conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause 
because the new guideline was "more onerous than the 
prior law." Id. at 431, 107 S.Ct. at 2452 (quoting Dobbert, 
432 U.S. at 294, 97 S.Ct. at 2299). At the time of the 
offense, the petitioner faced a presumptive sentence of 
three and one-half to four and one-half years in prison, but 
at the time of sentencing, the revised guidelines called for 
a presumptive sentence of five and one-half to seven years. 
In fact, the trial court sentenced the petitioner to seven 
years. See id. at 425, 107 S.Ct. at 2448. 
 
The Court held in Miller that the petitioner had been 
"substantially disadvantaged" by the change in Florida's law 
because under the prior law the sentencing judge would 
have had to depart from the guidelines to impose a seven- 
year term of imprisonment and provide a statement of clear 
and convincing reasons for the departure reviewable on 
appeal. See id. at 432, 107 S.Ct. at 2452. Under the revised 
law, the seven-year term was within the guidelines range 
and was unreviewable on appeal. Consequently, the Court 
concluded that by foreclosing the petitioner's ability "to 
challenge the imposition of a sentence longer than his 
presumptive sentence under the old law," id.  at 433, 107 
S.Ct. at 2452, the new law worked a "substantial 
disadvantage" to him. Accordingly, the Court held that the 
new law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
 
However, the Court in Miller, taking note of its holding in 
Dobbert, explained that, even when application of a new law 
works to a defendant's "disadvantage," the ex post facto 
prohibition "does not restrict `legislative control of remedies 
and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of 
substance.' " Id. at 433, 107 S.Ct. at 2452 (quoting Dobbert, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
disadvantage" of the defendants, see Lindsey , 301 U.S. at 401-02, 57 
S.Ct. at 799. Nevertheless, the Court in Collins  did not overrule 
Lindsey's 
holding, as well as its assessment that the change in the law in Lindsey 
was ex post facto because "the measure of punishment prescribed by the 
later statute is more severe than that of the earlier." 
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432 U.S. at 293, 97 S.Ct. at 2298). Hence, the Court will 
not find an "ex post facto violation . . . if the change is 
merely procedural and does `not increase the punishment, 
nor change the ingredients of the offence or the ultimate 
facts necessary to establish guilt.' " Id. , 107 S.Ct. at 2452- 
53 (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. at 590, 4 S.Ct. at 210, 
and citing Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293-94, 97 S.Ct. at 2298). 
The Court added, however, that "a change in the law that 
alters a substantial right can be ex post facto,`even if the 
statute takes a seemingly procedural form.' " Id., 107 S.Ct. 
at 2453 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 n.12, 101 S.Ct. at 
964 n.12). 
 
Applying Dobbert, the Court in Miller  observed that, 
"[a]lthough the distinction between substance and 
procedure might sometimes prove elusive, here the change 
at issue appears to have little about it that could be 
deemed procedural." Id., 107 S.Ct. at 2453. The Court 
found that "[t]he 20% increase in points for sexual offenses 
in no wise alters the method to be followed in determining 
the appropriate sentence: it simply inserts a larger number 
into the same equation." Id., 107 S.Ct. at 2453. Thus, the 
Court refused to characterize the revisions to Florida's 
sentencing guidelines as "merely procedural." 
 
In Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 
the Court abandoned portions of its analysis in Weaver and 
Miller, and it narrowed the scope of the framework for 
analyzing ex post facto claims. In Collins, the Court 
considered a situation in which a state court jury convicted 
the petitioner and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus 
a fine of $10,000. The petitioner argued in the state courts 
that the fine had been unauthorized under the law in effect 
at the time of sentencing, and he requested a new trial. 
Relying on an intervening change in state law not in effect 
at the time of the offense, the trial, or the sentencing, which 
allowed it to reform an improper jury verdict that assessed 
an unauthorized punishment, the state appellate court 
reformed the verdict by vacating the fine. Therefore, the 
appellate court denied the petitioner's request for a new 
trial, a form of relief to which he would have been entitled 
under state case law prior to enactment of the new statute. 
Id. at 39-40, 110 S.Ct. at 2717-18. 
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In his federal habeas petition in Collins, the petitioner 
claimed an ex post facto violation by reason of the use of 
the new jury verdict reformation law. The district court, 
however, denied relief on the ground that his punishment 
"was not increased (but actually decreased)" as a result of 
the change in the law. See id. at 40, 110 S.Ct. at 2718 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that, under Thompson 
v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 18 S.Ct. 620, retroactive 
applications of procedural statutes "violate the Ex Post 
Facto Clause unless they leave untouched all substantial 
protections with which existing law surrounds the person 
accused of the crime." Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The court of appeals held that the petitioner's 
right to a new trial under the governing case law was a 
"substantial protection," and thus it ordered the district 
court to grant habeas relief. 
 
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the 
definition of "ex post facto" that it had adopted in Beazell 
v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, was "faithful to the use 
of the term `ex post facto law' at the time the Constitution 
was adopted." Id. at 44, 110 S.Ct. at 2720. In Beazell, the 
Court ruled that a law is ex post facto if it "punishes as a 
crime an act previously committed, which was innocent 
when done; which makes more burdensome the 
punishment for a crime, after its commission; or which 
deprives one charged with crime of any defense available 
according to law at the time when the act was committed." 
Beazell, 269 U.S. at 169, 46 S.Ct. at 68. Limiting its 
analysis to these three "Beazell categories," the Court in 
Collins rejected the petitioner's ex post facto claim. 
 
The Court found that the sentencing reformation law was 
merely "a procedural change that allow[ed] reformation of 
improper verdicts." Collins, 497 U.S. at 44, 110 S.Ct. at 
2720. It thus rejected the court of appeals' holding that the 
statute, although clearly procedural, was nevertheless ex 
post facto because it denied the petitioner a "substantial 
protection," i.e., the right to a new trial that had been 
available at the time of sentencing. The Court noted that 
"[s]everal of [its] cases have described as `procedural' those 
changes which, even though they work to the disadvantage 
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of the accused, do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause." Id. 
at 45, 110 S.Ct. at 2720 (citing Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 292-93 
& n.6, 97 S.Ct. 2297-98 & n.6; Beazell, 269 U.S. at 171, 46 
S.Ct. at 69; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 597, 21 
S.Ct. 730, 733 (1901)). The Court added that, "[w]hile these 
cases do not explicitly define what they mean by the word 
`procedural,' it is logical to think that the term refers to 
changes in the procedures by which a criminal case is 
adjudicated, as opposed to changes in the substantive law 
of crimes." Id. 
 
The Court observed, however, that it also had stated in 
several cases "that a procedural change may constitute an 
ex post facto violation if it `affect[s] matters of substance,' 
. . . by depriving a defendant of `substantial protections 
with which the existing law surrounds the person accused 
of crime,' . . . or arbitrarily infringing upon`substantial 
personal rights.' " Id. (citations omitted). The Court found 
that such language had "imported confusion into the 
interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause." Id. at 45, 110 
S.Ct. at 2721. Thus, the Court ruled in Collins  that "[t]he 
references in [earlier cases] to `substantial protections' and 
`personal rights' should not be read to adopt without 
explanation an undefined enlargement of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause" as defined in Beazell. See id. at 46, 110 S.Ct. at 
2721. The Court explained that the proper meaning of 
those earlier cases is that "by simply labeling a law 
`procedural,' a legislature does not thereby immunize it 
from scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause." Id. at 46. 
Ultimately, the Court in Collins expressly overruled 
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 18 S.Ct. 620, and Kring 
v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, two cases which the 
Court had cited in Weaver for the proposition that 
"[a]lteration of a substantial right . . . is not merely 
procedural, even if the statute takes a seemingly procedural 
form." Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 n.12, 101 S.Ct. at 964 n.12.3 
 
In California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 
U.S. 499, 115 S.Ct. 1597 (1995), the Court explained that, 
in light of the framework it set forth in Collins, "the focus 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Miller cited Weaver for the same point. Miller, 482 U.S. at 433, 107 
S.Ct. at 2453. 
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of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative 
change produces some ambiguous sort of `disadvantage,' " 
as language in Miller, Weaver and Lindsey had suggested. 
Rather, the proper focus is limited to whether the change in 
the law "alters the definition of criminal conduct or 
increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable." Id. 
at 506 n.3, 115 S.Ct. at 1602 n.3. The Court noted in 
Morales that it nevertheless had reached the correct result 
in those three cases because in each of them the law at 
issue impermissibly increased the "quantum of 
punishment" that had been prescribed at the time of the 
offense. Id. at 505-06 & n.3, 115 S.Ct. at 1601-03 & n.3. 
 
The particular holding in Morales was that an 
amendment to California's parole procedures which 
decreased the frequency of parole hearings for certain 
offenders had not changed the quantum of punishment 
attached to the petitioner's offense, and therefore was not 
ex post facto. The amendment allowed the Parole Board, 
after holding an initial hearing, to defer for up to three 
years a subsequent parole suitability hearing for prisoners 
convicted of multiple murders if the Board found that it 
was unreasonable to expect that it would grant parole at a 
hearing during the subsequent years. The Court explained 
that the relevant inquiry is whether the "change alters the 
definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by 
which a crime is punishable." Id. at 506 n.3, 115 S.Ct. at 
1602 n.3. The Court determined that "there is no reason to 
conclude that the amendment will have any effect on any 
prisoner's actual term of confinement." Id.  at 512, 115 S.Ct. 
at 1604. Thus, the Court found that the petitioner failed to 
show, as required under Collins, that the new law actually 
had increased, and not merely posed an attenuated or 
theoretical possibility of increasing, the quantum of 
punishment for his offense. 
 
The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that"the Ex 
Post Facto Clause forbids any legislative change that has 
any conceivable risk of affecting a prisoner's punishment." 
Id. at 508, 115 S.Ct. at 1602. The Court noted that "the 
question of what legislative adjustments will be held to be 
of sufficient moment to transgress the [ex post facto] 
prohibition must be a matter of degree." Id.  at 509, 115 
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S.Ct. at 1603 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 
Court declined "to articulate a single `formula' for 
identifying those legislative changes that have a sufficient 
effect on substantive crimes or punishments to fall within 
the prohibition." Id. The Court ruled that the law at issue 
in Morales "creates only the most speculative and 
attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect of 
increasing the measure of punishment for covered crimes, 
and such conjectural effects are insufficient under any 
threshold we might establish under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause." Id. at 509, 115 S.Ct. at 1603 (citing Dobbert, 432 
U.S. at 294, 97 S.Ct. at 2299). 
 
In Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 117 S.Ct. 891, the 
Court again applied Collins and inquired whether the law at 
issue retrospectively increased the quantum of punishment 
for the petitioner's offense. The law challenged in Lynce 
canceled the petitioner's award of 1,860 days of provisional 
early release credits, which had been granted for the sole 
purpose of alleviating prison overcrowding. The Court 
concluded that the new law was ex post facto because its 
effect was to lengthen the petitioner's sentence, thereby 
retrospectively increasing the quantum of punishment. See 
id. at 445, 117 S.Ct. at 897-98. 
 
But in Lynce, unlike in Morales, the new law actually 
increased the petitioner's term of incarceration so its effect 
was neither speculative nor attenuated. The Court rejected 
in Lynce any suggestion that the new law was"merely 
procedural." Id. at 447 n.17, 117 S.Ct. at 898 n.17. The 
Court cited Dobbert for the proposition"that a procedural 
statute is one that `simply alters the methods employed in 
determining' whether the punishment is `to be imposed' 
rather than `chang[ing] the quantum of punishment 
attached to the crime.' " Id. (quoting Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 
293-94, 97 S.Ct. at 2298) (internal punctuation omitted) 
(alteration in original). The Court ruled that, unlike in 
Dobbert, the law challenged in Lynce was not "merely 
procedural" because it "did not change the method of 
determining the sentence, but rather lengthened the 
sentences of certain prisoners by making them ineligible for 
early release[.]" Id. 
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Recently in Garner v. Jones, 120 S.Ct. 1362 (2000), the 
Court was concerned with a situation similar to that in 
Morales in that it considered an ex post facto challenge to 
a rule extending the time for required reconsideration of 
denied parole applications from every three years to every 
eight years. Based on the record presented, the Court 
upheld the application of the amended rule, as the prisoner 
had not demonstrated that it created "a significant risk of 
prolonging [his] incarceration," and "the requisite risk [was] 
not inherent in the framework" of the rule. Id. at 1368. The 
Court cited Morales for the point that the Ex Post Facto 
Clause should not be employed for the micromanagement 
of an endless array of legislative adjustments to parole and 
sentencing procedures. Id. Moreover, the Court noted that 
the ex post facto doctrine included to some extent the 
concept that before a criminal commits an offense, he 
should have either actual or constructive notice of the 
penalty for the transgression. Id. at 1369. 
 
In Garner, however, the Court did not make a definitive 
statement of the scope of ex post facto protections. Indeed, 
the Court did not make an analysis of Beazell , Collins, 
Dobbert, or Lindsey, the cases which, as will be seen, we 
regard as its most significant on the ex post facto issue we 
consider here. In fact, the Court did not cite Dobbert or 
Lindsey. Rather, Garner's particular significance is in the 
area of modification of parole procedures. 
 
The Court's most recent ex post facto case is Carmell v. 
Texas, 68 U.S.L.W. 4325 (U.S. May 1, 2000). In Carmell the 
Court was concerned with a section of a Texas statute 
which provided that in certain sexual offenses a conviction 
"is supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the 
victim of the sexual offense if the victim informed any 
person, other than the defendant, of the alleged offense 
within six months after the date on which the offense is 
alleged to have occurred." Id. at 4326. This requirement is 
referred to as an "outcry" provision. Until September 1, 
1993, the requirement that the victim inform another 
person of the alleged offense did not apply "if the victim was 
younger than 14 years of age at the time of the alleged 
offense." Id. The statute, however, was amended in 1993 to 
extend the child victim exception to victims under 18 years 
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old. The convictions at issue in Carmell were for offenses 
before the amendment when the victim was 14 or 15 years 
old. Id. at 4327. Thus, the petitioner argued that the 
convictions could not stand under the Ex Post Facto Clause 
because the victim was not under 14 years old at the time 
of the offenses and she had not made a timely outcry. The 
Texas courts rejected his argument, upholding the 
application of the statutory amendment against an ex post 
facto challenge. 
 
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that in Collins it had 
not intended to suggest that in Beazell it had abandoned 
the fourth Calder category, i.e., see Calder, 3 Dall. at 390, 
that the Ex Post Facto Clause precludes a "law that alters 
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, 
testimony, than the law required at the time of the 
commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender." 
Id. at 4330. Thus, it held that the 1993 amendment to the 
Texas law was ex post facto as applied to the petitioner 
because it reduced the "quantum of evidence" necessary to 
convict the petitioner inasmuch as without the amendment 
he could not have been convicted on the counts in 
question. Carmell like Garner did not, however, make a 
definitive statement of the scope of ex post facto protections 
as it was dealing with a narrow situation not concerned 
with the quantum of punishment. Moreover, it dealt with a 
Calder category of ex post facto laws not implicated on this 
appeal. 
 
Having completed our review of the Supreme Court's ex 
post facto cases we now return to consideration of our 
obligations under Williams v. Taylor. As we have indicated 
the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses in 
28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1) have independent meaning. See 
Williams v. Taylor, 68 U.S.L.W. at 4275. Thus, claims may 
fit within one of these clauses more "comfortably" than the 
other. See id. But still when a petitioner presents a claim 
as does Ferguson which challenges a statutory scheme 
rather than only the outcome in a particular case we 
believe that we have an obligation to make our analysis 
under both clauses, particularly inasmuch as Ferguson has 
presented his ex post facto claim under both clauses. 
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We turn to the "contrary to" clause first as 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(d)(1) lists it first. In light of our foregoing analysis of 
the Supreme Court's ex post facto cases, we conclude that 
the Court has established certain ex post facto rules with 
sufficient specificity so that we may make a determination 
under the AEDPA whether the Delaware Supreme Court's 
decisions in Cohen and Ferguson were contrary to clearly 
established federal law as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. In particular, under the 
framework set forth in Collins, a law violates the Ex Post 
Facto Clause if it is both retrospective and increases the 
penalty by which a crime is punishable, a standard which 
requires the petitioner to show that the law retrospectively 
increased or made more onerous the "quantum of 
punishment" attached to the crime. The infringement of a 
"substantial right" or a showing of a mere"disadvantage" as 
a result of a new law is insufficient. 
 
In addition, as the Court explained in Dobbert  and 
Collins, a law is "merely procedural," and not ex post facto, 
if it simply alters the methods employed in determining the 
punishment to be imposed as opposed to working a 
substantive change in the quantum of punishment 
attached to the crime. Moreover, the Court consistently has 
applied these rules, and they are quite specific. Thus, we 
conclude that the Supreme Court cases formulate rules to 
apply when an ex post facto claim is made so that we can 
consider the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Cohen, 
and hence its decision in Ferguson, under the AEDPA's 
"contrary to" clause. 
 
We emphasize that Lindsey did not establish a 
sufficiently specific "framework" or rule of law that is any 
different from the rules we have noted. In Lindsey, the 
Court found a law to be ex post facto because its effect was 
"to make mandatory what was before only the maximum 
sentence." Lindsey, 301 U.S. at 400, 57 S.Ct. at 798-99. 
That holding survives under Collins because, as the Court 
noted in Morales, it is clear that the law challenged in 
Lindsey impermissibly increased the "quantum of 
punishment" prescribed at the time of the offense. See 
Morales, 514 U.S. at 505-06 & n.3, 115 S.Ct. at 1601-02 & 
n.3. Thus, while it might be argued that Lindsey  
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established a rule that "a law is ex post facto if it makes 
mandatory what was before only the maximum sentence," 
in view of the Court's subsequent refinements it is more 
accurate to say that the rule in Lindsey is that a statute is 
ex post facto if it retroactively makes the quantum of 
punishment for an offense more onerous. Of course, there 
was such a violation in Lindsey because the new law made 
mandatory a sentence that was only a maximum at the 
time of the petitioners' offenses. 
 
The Court, however, did not define formally in Lindsey 
what makes a law "mandatory" for ex post facto purposes, 
and it did not expressly generalize its holding into a 
framework or rule for future cases. In addition, while the 
Court in Weaver cited Lindsey for the proposition that "a 
law may be retrospective not only if it alters the length of 
the sentence, but also if it changes the maximum sentence 
from discretionary to mandatory," 450 U.S. at 32 n.17, 101 
S.Ct. at 966 n.17, it did so to illuminate its point that "the 
critical question" in an ex post facto analysis"is whether 
the new provision imposes greater punishment after 
commission of the offense, not merely whether it increases 
a criminal sentence." Id. Thus, rather than establishing a 
framework or rule of law in its own right, we regard Lindsey 
as merely one of the continuum of cases applying the 
Beazell categories the Court reaffirmed in Collins, and 
which the Court further explained in Carmell. 
 
Carmell, of course, does not supply an ex post facto rule 
applicable here as it merely held that the state could not 
reduce the quantum of evidence necessary to convict the 
petitioner, at least in the manner it did, an application of 
the Ex Post Facto Clause not implicated here. Moreover, the 
Court emphasized that "a sufficiency of the evidence rule 
resonates with the interest to which the Ex Post Facto 
Clause is addressed" because "the elements of unfairness 
and injustice in subverting the presumption of innocence 
are directly implicated by rules lowering the quantum of 
evidence required to convict." Carmell, 68 U.S.L.W. at 4335. 
These interests, derived from the fourth Calder  category, 
are not involved in this case. 
 
(b) The Delaware Supreme Court's opinions 
 
Against this backdrop of relevant Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, we return now to the Delaware Supreme 
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Court's decision in Cohen, and hence its ruling in Ferguson, 
so that we may consider each under the AEDPA standards 
as clarified in Williams v. Taylor. The state court first ruled 
in Cohen that, "[g]iven the teaching in Dobbert, it is clear 
that the changes effected by Delaware's new death penalty 
statute are procedural. The revisions in the new law, like 
those in Dobbert, merely altered the method of determining 
imposition of the death penalty. The quantum of 
punishment for the crime of first-degree murder in 
Delaware remains unchanged." Cohen, 604 A.2d at 853. 
The Court added in Ferguson that, "[t]he restrictive nature 
of the advisory jury's findings and the mandatory 
imposition of the death penalty by the sentencing judge 
under the amended statute are likewise `procedural,' and 
therefore do not implicate ex post facto concerns." 
Ferguson, 642 A.2d at 783. 
 
It is unquestionable that the changes enacted by the 
amended Delaware law simply have "altered the methods 
employed in determining the punishment to be imposed." 
For example, like the law at issue in Dobbert , Delaware's 
amended law reassigned the task of imposing sentence 
from the jury to the court, a change which Ferguson's 
attorney at oral argument before us acknowledged in itself 
did not implicate ex post facto concerns and in light of 
Dobbert hardly could have done so.4  In addition, the 
amended statute retained life imprisonment or death as the 
range of sentences for first-degree murder, and merely 
redesigned the method or formula for determining which of 
the two sentencing choices should be imposed in a given 
case. Thus, we are satisfied that the amended Delaware law 
fully justified the state court's reliance on Dobbert and its 
conclusion that the changes were "merely procedural." 
 
Nevertheless we must continue our analysis because at 
the time of Ferguson's offenses, Delaware did not require a 
death sentence when aggravating circumstances were found 
to outweigh mitigating circumstances, as the jury could 
impose a sentence of life imprisonment in that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We also note that in general there is no federal constitutional right 
to 
a jury trial on sentencing in a capital case. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 
494 U.S. 738, 745-46, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1446-47 (1990). 
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circumstance. At the time of his sentencing, however, the 
amended law required a death sentence once the court 
determined that aggravating circumstances outweighed 
mitigating circumstances. 
 
While these changes arguably implicate the holding 
under Lindsey, the Delaware Supreme Court in Cohen 
distinguished Lindsey by ruling that the amended law 
 
       is not `mandatory' . . . [because] imposition of the 
       death penalty is based upon the predicate factual 
       findings made by the jury and trial judge as to 
       aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The 
       existence of such factors and their relative weight, 
       although ultimately determined by the trial judge, do 
       not mandate a death sentence unless the aggravating 
       factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Thus, 
       the new law is not `impermissibly mandatory.' 
 
Cohen, 604 A.2d at 855. As we have indicated, in support 
of this proposition the court cited Walton v. Arizona, 497 
U.S. at 650-52, 110 S.Ct. at 3056; Blystone v. 
Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. at 306-07, 110 S.Ct. at 1083; 
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. at 374, 110 S.Ct. at 1195; 
and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 260-61, 96 S.Ct. at 2970. 
Of course, each of those cases presented a challenge to a 
death penalty statute under the Eighth Amendment which 
prohibits the imposition of an "impermissibly mandatory" 
death sentence, i.e., a death sentence that is imposed 
automatically upon conviction without an individualized 
inquiry into the defendant and the nature of the crime. See, 
e.g., Blystone, 494 U.S. at 305, 110 S.Ct. at 1082-83. The 
cases nevertheless are germane to the question of whether 
the amended sentencing statute "increased the quantum of 
punishment" for Ferguson's capital offenses, which is the 
relevant inquiry under the Ex Post Facto Clause, as the ex 
post facto inquiry considers the alleged mandatory aspects 
of a sentencing. See Lindsey, 301 U.S. at 400, 57 S.Ct. at 
798-99; see also Morales, 514 U.S. at 506 n.3, 115 S.Ct. at 
1602 n.3. 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court in Cohen further 
distinguished Lindsey and its own opinion in Dickerson by 
ruling that a death sentence under the amended law is not 
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truly "mandatory" because the trial court must assign a 
"relative weight" to the aggravating and mitigating evidence 
before it determines which sentence, life imprisonment or 
death, is required by the statute. Therefore, given the 
presence of a "weighing process," the Delaware court 
concluded that "[t]he sentencing process remains basically 
discretionary, merely shifting the ultimate decision from the 
jury to the trial judge." Cohen, 604 A.2d at 855. 
 
Thus, though the jury convicted Ferguson of first-degree 
murder the court did not impose a death sentence 
automatically. Rather, it held a separate hearing to 
determine whether to impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment or death. Before imposing sentence, the trial 
court weighed the evidence presented at the hearing as well 
as the jury's sentencing recommendation, and then made a 
determination that in Ferguson's case the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. 
Obviously, the court could have reached the opposite result 
in this inherently subjective evaluation for aggravating 
circumstances cannot outweigh mitigating circumstances in 
the definitive sense that a ton necessarily outweighs a 
pound. Accordingly, it is perfectly clear that, as the 
Delaware Supreme Court explained, the "weighing process" 
effectively insured that the death penalty was a 
discretionary maximum sentence, and therefore, the death 
sentence was not "mandatory" in the sense contemplated in 
Lindsey.5 
 
The district court agreed with the Delaware Supreme 
Court's analysis, citing the following rationale: 
 
       The current case is somewhat different from Lindsey. 
       The revised Delaware statute does not make the 
       maximum penalty for first-degree murder, death, 
       mandatory. The options remain the same: life 
       imprisonment or death. The difference is that under 
       the old statute the decisionmaker needed to weigh the 
       aggravating and mitigating factors, but was not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Moreover, although our conclusion is not dependent on this point, we 
are satisfied that if the court held that the mitigating circumstances 
outweighed the aggravating circumstances, its determination would not 
have been subject to appellate review. 
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       necessarily compelled by the outcome of that weighing 
       process. Under the revised law, if the aggravating 
       circumstances are found to outweigh the mitigating 
       circumstances, then a decision of death is commanded. 
       If the opposite conclusion is reached, a sentence of life 
       imprisonment is required. The discretion of the 
       sentencing authority is therefore not eliminated, but is 
       restricted to a reasoned consideration of relevant 
       aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The 
       sentencing decision has not been reduced to a 
       mechanical exercise, as it was in Lindsey. 
 
Ferguson v. State, 1996 WL 1056727, at *9. 
 
We find this analysis compelling and thus we will not 
hold that Lindsey "required" the Delaware Supreme Court 
to find that the amended law violated the Ex Post Facto 
clause or that there was an ex post facto violation in this 
case. Indeed, in our view we could not possibly hold that 
the Delaware Supreme Court's opinions in Cohen  and 
Ferguson were "opposite" to any opinions of the Supreme 
Court. While Delaware's amended law undoubtedly 
established standards for a trial court to consider when 
imposing sentence in a capital case, the law did not 
eliminate discretion from the sentencing process, something 
which Lindsey suggested is required to establish an ex post 
facto violation. See Lindsey, 301 U.S. at 400-01, 57 S.Ct. at 
798-99. 
 
We recognize that the amended law eliminates the 
possibility that a defendant will receive a life sentence on 
the basis of a single juror refusing to vote for death. 
Consequently, we think that it is reasonable to believe that 
the amended law makes it more likely that a defendant will 
receive a death sentence than would have been the case 
under the earlier law. But that circumstance only 
establishes that a defendant is "disadvantaged" by the 
amended law, which is an insufficient basis to establish an 
ex post facto violation unless the change in the law actually 
increased the quantum of punishment for the offense. 6 See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We note that the dissenting opinion in Garner pointed out that the 
parole board's chairman said its policies "were intended to increase time 
served in prison." Garner, 120 S.Ct. at 1373 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
Apparently, the majority was not moved by this observation. 
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Morales, 514 U.S. at 506 n.3, 115 S.Ct. at 1602 n.3. In 
sum, we have considered all of the Supreme Court cases 
and simply cannot find that the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Delaware in Cohen and Ferguson  are contrary to 
any of them, at least to the extent that they have not been 
overruled. In fact, we would have reached the result we do 
even if we exercised independent judgment in the way 
required before the adoption of the AEDPA. See Williams v. 
Taylor, 68 U.S.L.W. at 4274. In the circumstances, if we 
found an ex post facto violation here we surely would be 
unfaithful to our obligations under the AEDPA. 
 
Our conclusion that the decisions in Cohen and Ferguson 
upholding the amended law do not violate the "contrary to" 
clause of the AEDPA takes us to the question of whether 
the Delaware court's result nevertheless was an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law 
as determined by the United States Supreme Court. See 28 
U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1). In considering this possibility we will 
not repeat our analysis of the Supreme Court cases. 
Rather, we merely state that we are satisfied that we cannot 
hold that the Delaware Supreme Court's opinions in Cohen 
and Ferguson were an unreasonable application of clearly 
established federal law as determined by the United States 
Supreme Court. Quite to the contrary, we have no basis to 
hold that the Delaware Court unreasonably applied the 
Supreme Court's ex post facto cases to the facts of this case 
or unreasonably refused to extend ex post facto principles 
to this case. See Williams v. Taylor, 68 U.S.L.W. at 4276. 
Indeed, we think that the Delaware Supreme Court reached 
the correct result and, as we have indicated, even 
exercising the independent judgment required by pre- 
AEDPA law we would have come to the result it did. 
 
We close our consideration of the ex post facto issue with 
a final observation. Ferguson argues that under the 
amended law the percentage of defendants convicted of first 
degree murder sentenced to death has increased 
substantially from the percentage under the earlier law in 
effect at the time of his offenses. This contention, however, 
even if true is without legal significance because the 
legislature neither has increased nor made mandatory the 
penalty for first-degree murder and the mere fact, if such 
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be the case, that the change disadvantaged Ferguson and 
other defendants in capital cases cannot lead us to a 
different result. Moreover, we must consider the increased 
imposition of the death penalty against the circumstance 
that under the amended law the court as opposed to a 
unanimous jury must determine to impose a death penalty. 
Surely it would be expected that, in light of that difference, 
there would have been more sentences of death. Yet, as we 
have indicated, Ferguson acknowledges that the transfer of 
the responsibility to make the ultimate decision to the court 
does not in itself raise ex post facto concerns and plainly it 
does not. Thus, we reject Ferguson's ex post facto 
arguments. 
 
C. Duplicative Aggravating Statutory Circumstances 
 
As we have indicated, during the penalty phase of 
Ferguson's case, the state advanced three statutory 
aggravating circumstances in support of the death penalty: 
(1) Ferguson previously had been convicted of murder, 
manslaughter or a violent felony;7 (2) he committed the 
murder in this case for pecuniary gain; and (3) he 
committed the murder during the course of a robbery. Both 
the jury and the court found that the prosecution had 
proven each of the three aggravating circumstances with 
respect to both counts of first degree murder. But Ferguson 
contends that murder for pecuniary gain and murder 
during the course of a robbery are the same aggravating 
factor as a person who attempts to rob someone necessarily 
seeks pecuniary gain. Thus, in his view, the court permitted 
the jury to "double count" the factor. Accordingly, he 
argues, the sentencing scheme was arbitrary and 
capricious in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
 
(a) Exhaustion 
 
The state argues, as it did in the district court, that the 
duplicate aggravating circumstances claim is unexhausted 
because Ferguson did not present it to the state courts in 
terms of the denial of a federal right. See Duncan v. Henry, 
513 U.S. 364, 365-66, 115 S.Ct. 887-88 (1995) (per 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The evidence established that Ferguson had been convicted of murder 
and aggravated assault. 
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curiam). Yet in his supplemental opening brief to the 
Delaware Supreme Court, Ferguson cited Espinosa v. 
Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 2926 (1992), in support 
of his argument that the court should have instructed the 
jury to consider these two duplicative factors as one when 
balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors. In 
Espinosa, the Supreme Court held that in states where the 
sentencer must weigh the aggravating and mitigating 
factors, the weighing of an invalid factor violates the Eighth 
Amendment. Id. at 1082, 112 S.Ct. at 2928. Thus, 
Ferguson supported his argument by citing Supreme Court 
case law which directly addressed the Eighth Amendment 
argument he advanced. Accordingly, he did present his 
duplicative aggravating circumstance claim in terms of the 
denial of the same federal right he asserts here. 
 
The state nevertheless emphasizes that the Delaware 
Supreme Court did not analyze Ferguson's duplicative 
circumstances claim in federal terms. But to satisfy the 
exhaustion requirement, a defendant only need have given 
the state courts the opportunity to pass on the merits of a 
claim. See Picard v. Connor, 450 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 
509, 512 (1971). Moreover, in its opinion in Ferguson, the 
Delaware Supreme Court indicated that it previously had 
held in Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581 (Del. 1985), that "the 
question of whether these aggravating circumstances are 
`duplicative' is a matter of statutory construction, rather 
than an issue of constitutionality." Ferguson , 642 A.2d at 
782 (citing Deputy, 500 A.2d at 600-01). However, in 
Deputy the court relied on its previous decision in Flamer v. 
State, 490 A.2d 104, 125 (Del. 1983), which had noted that 
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976), 
the United States Supreme Court upheld a sentence of 
death in which these same two allegedly duplicative 
aggravating circumstances were presented to the jury 
without an instruction to treat them as a single factor. See 
Deputy, 500 A.2d at 600-01. The Delaware court in Deputy 
noted that in Gregg the Supreme Court held that the 
"statutory system under which [the defendant] was 
sentenced to death does not violate the Constitution." Id. at 
600-01. Therefore, it appears that the Delaware Supreme 
Court in Ferguson's case limited its review to a question of 
statutory construction in reliance on its conclusion that the 
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Supreme Court had rejected the constitutional basis for the 
argument. It thus did not confine its review because 
Ferguson failed to assert a constitutional claim. 
Accordingly, the duplicative aggravating statutory 
circumstances claim is exhausted. 
 
(b) Merits of the claim 
 
In our view, the Delaware court read Gregg v. Georgia too 
broadly. In Gregg, although the petitioner attacked certain 
aggravating circumstances as vague and therefore violative 
of the Eighth Amendment, he did not raise a duplicative 
aggravating circumstances argument before the Supreme 
Court. Indeed, the Court emphasized that it was reviewing 
the sentencing system "as a whole". See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 
200, 96 S.Ct. at 2938. Thus, notwithstanding the Delaware 
court's reliance on Gregg, we are satisfied that it did not 
pass on Ferguson's Eighth Amendment constitutional 
duplicative aggravating circumstances argument, even 
though it had the opportunity to do so. Accordingly, we 
cannot say that the Delaware Supreme Court took into 
account controlling Supreme Court decisions. This point is 
critical because under the AEDPA the limitation on the 
granting of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is 
only "with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 
merits in State court proceedings." Hence we exercise pre- 
AEDPA independent judgment on the duplicative 
aggravating circumstances claim. 
 
In considering the duplicative aggravating circumstances 
claim, we recognize that the Delaware Supreme Court's 
interpretation of state law is entitled to deference. The court 
rejected the claim, holding that under Delaware law, the 
robbery and pecuniary gain claims are not always 
duplicative. See Ferguson, 642 A.2d at 782. It noted that in 
Delaware robbery is defined as forcible theft, which 
"encompasses two separate concepts: `[T]he actor may 
intend to deprive the owner of property, or his mind may be 
focused rather on gain to himself or another mind entitled 
thereto.' " Id. (emphasis in original). The court therefore 
concluded that not all robberies are committed for 
pecuniary gain and thus "those two factors are not always 
duplicative." Id. But the Delaware Supreme Court's 
explanation of state law does not resolve the duplicative 
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aggravating circumstances claim for the court at Ferguson's 
trial did not instruct the jury with respect to the two 
concepts of theft. See app. at 109-19. Moreover, there was 
no evidence at the trial that Ferguson intended to deprive 
his victim of his money for any other purpose other than 
pecuniary gain. Consequently, the distinction dependent on 
the nature of the theft the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Ferguson drew was not tied to the circumstances 
surrounding the consideration of the aggravating factors at 
Ferguson's trial. 
 
We also recognize that the Delaware Supreme Court 
further distinguished the two aggravating factors as follows: 
"Robbery, as an aggravating factor, focuses on the means of 
accomplishing the crime, i.e., force. Pecuniary gain, as an 
aggravating factor, focuses on the motive for the crime, i.e. 
either gain or owner deprivation." Ferguson , 642 A.2d at 
782 (emphasis in original). Once again, although the two 
aggravators may be conceptually distinct, the trial court did 
not instruct the jury to consider these concepts in the 
discrete way the Delaware Supreme Court described them 
and consequently, whatever might be true in other cases, 
the distinction the court made is not germane here. See 
app. at 109-19. Accordingly, we cannot resolve the 
duplicative aggravating circumstances issue by holding that 
in fact at Ferguson's trial the pecuniary gain and robbery 
circumstances were not duplicative. 
 
Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that the robbery 
and pecuniary gain factors were duplicative in this case, we 
are satisfied that the jury's consideration of them did not 
constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. We held in 
Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc), 
that Delaware's death penalty statute prior to its 1991 
amendment was a "non-weighing statute," that is, after the 
jury narrowed the class of persons eligible for the death 
penalty based on a finding of at least one statutory 
aggravating factor, it then determined whether the 
aggravating circumstances, statutory or not, outweighed 
the mitigating circumstances. See id. at 745-49. The latter 
stage of the sentencing process is described as the 
"selection" stage because the jury determines whether the 
particular defendant found to be eligible for the death 
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penalty should be sentenced to death. See United States v. 
McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1106 (10th Cir. 1996). 8 We 
reiterate that in making this selection in a non-weighing 
state the jury considers all aggravating circumstances, not 
merely those enumerated in the statute. See Flamer, 68 
F.3d at 749. In contrast, during this latter stage under a 
"weighing statute," the jury is required to weigh only the 
statutory aggravating factors against any mitigating factors. 
 
Determining whether a sentencing scheme is a "weighing 
statute" is pivotal in our duplicative circumstances inquiry. 
In Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 754, 110 S.Ct. 
1441, 1451 (1990), the Court held that in a weighing state 
if the jury considers an invalid statutory aggravating 
circumstance at the selection stage, on appeal the court 
either must reweigh the remaining valid statutory 
aggravators and any mitigating circumstance or make a 
harmless error analysis. But Zant v. Stephens , 462 U.S. 
862, 881, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2745 (1983), held that in a non- 
weighing state the consideration of an invalid statutory 
aggravator at the narrowing stage does not render a death 
verdict at the selection stage constitutionally infirm, 
provided there is at least one valid statutory aggravator 
rendering the defendant death penalty eligible. Plainly if 
Zant is applicable Ferguson's duplicative aggravating 
circumstances argument must fail. 
 
Ferguson makes several arguments in support of 
construing the Delaware statute as a weighing statute. He 
first contends that notwithstanding our opinion in Flamer 
the 1991 amendments transformed the statute into a 
weighing statute. See br. at 36. However, as the state notes, 
the 1991 amendments did not alter the relevant provisions 
regarding what is to be considered during the selection 
stage in a capital case. While the amendments did change 
the functions of the jury and the court in the sentencing 
process, making the court the ultimate decisionmaker, this 
modification made the sentencing scheme consistent with 
the one at issue in Zant and did not change Delaware to a 
"weighing" state. Because the Delaware statute has not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Rehearing was denied in McCullah but the opinion on rehearing is not 
germane to the point involved here. See 87 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 1996). 
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been amended in any significant way relevant to the 
duplicative factors issue, we are bound by our persuasive 
opinion in Flamer, which concluded that the Delaware 
sentencing statute is not a "weighing statute." See Flamer, 
68 F.3d at 749. Indeed, Flamer recognized that the 1991 
amendments were, with respect to the weighing issue, 
"substantially the same" as earlier law. See id. at 740 n.1. 
Thus, in light of Zant Ferguson's duplicative aggravating 
circumstances argument must fail even if the robbery and 
pecuniary gain aggravators are singular in character. 
 
We recognize that Ferguson argues further that the effect 
of the jury charge and the special interrogatory submitted 
to it was to transform the statute as applied into a 
"weighing" sentencing scheme by leading the jury to believe 
that it was required to rely on statutory aggravating factors 
in recommending a sentence. See br. at 39-41. We rejected 
a similar argument in Flamer even though the special 
interrogatory in that case arguably could have suggested to 
the jury that it could not impose the death sentence at the 
selection stage unless it relied on a statutory aggravating 
circumstance. 
 
In this case Ferguson's argument is weaker on this 
transformation point because the interrogatory submitted 
to the jury at his trial was not ambiguous in this respect as 
it provided as follows: 
 
       #1 Do you find the following statutory aggravating 
       circumstance has been proven to exist beyond a 
       reasonable doubt? . . . 
 
       #2 Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence, 
       after weighing all relevant evidence in aggravation 
       or mitigation which bears upon the particular 
       circumstances or details of the commission of the 
       offense and the character and propensities of the 
       offender, the aggravating circumstances found to 
       exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found 
       to exist? 
 
App. at 120-21. Moreover, the interrogatory did not ask the 
jury, as was the case in Flamer, see 68 F.3d at 751, to 
specify the specific statutory aggravating circumstances on 
which it relied, if any, during the selection stage. 
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Furthermore, the court specifically instructed the jury that 
it was not limited to consideration of the statutory 
aggravating circumstances: 
 
       Delaware law specifies certain statutory aggravating 
       circumstances which the State may contend exist in a 
       particular case. The law does not specify, define, or 
       otherwise identify what constitutes a mitigating 
       circumstance, but the defendant may offer evidence 
       relating to any mitigating circumstance which it 
       contends exists in a particular case. The State may 
       likewise offer evidence as to matters in aggravation in 
       addition to any statutory aggravating circumstances 
       they seek to prove. 
 
       An aggravating circumstance is a factor which tends to 
       make the defendant's conduct more serious or 
       imposition of a penalty of death more appropriate. 
 
       . . . 
 
       After you have decided whether one or more statutory 
       aggravating circumstances exists, you must then weigh 
       and consider the mitigating circumstances and the 
       aggravating circumstances including, but not limited 
       to, the statutory aggravating circumstance or 
       circumstances that you may have already found to 
       exist. 
 
App. at 113-16. 
 
Thus, while court clearly instructed the jury to consider 
the statutory aggravating circumstances, the court did not 
give the jury the impression that it could not impose the 
death penalty unless it relied on one of these factors. 
Furthermore, the prosecutor argued at length to the jury 
regarding the presence of nonstatutory aggravating factors 
and Ferguson's attorney and Ferguson personally argued to 
the jury that it should take into account numerous 
mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, the interrogatory did 
not convert the selection stage at Ferguson's trial into a 
weighing process in a Clemons sense.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We note that in making its decision the court at Ferguson's trial 
specifically relied in part on aggravating circumstances that were not 
included in the three factors the jury found. 
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Ferguson nevertheless suggests that consideration by the 
jury of any statutory aggravating circumstances during the 
selection stage transforms the statute into a weighing 
scheme. See br. at 38-39. To support this argument, 
Ferguson focuses on the dissent's reasoning in Flamer; 
however, the majority in Flamer rejected this contention. 
See Flamer, 68 F.3d at 749. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
noted that the statutory scheme in Zant, which was a non- 
weighing statute, did not "place particular  emphasis on the 
role of statutory aggravating circumstances" during the 
selection stage. Zant, 462 U.S. at 889, 103 S.Ct. at 2749. 
The Court did not indicate that any consideration would 
have transformed the statute into a weighing scheme. 
Indeed, the Court's opinion presupposes that consideration 
of all aggravating circumstances at the selection stage 
includes those enumerated by statute. Likewise, in 
Delaware, the jury is instructed to consider all  aggravating 
circumstances, and is not instructed to place particular 
emphasis on the statutory factors. 
 
As Ferguson concedes, in reviewing a non-weighing 
statute, this court may uphold a death verdict where the 
jury considered an invalid statutory aggravating factor, br. 
at 36, if the jury also found a valid statutory factor. Of 
course, here we know that the jury found at least two valid 
statutory factors. Furthermore, while the Supreme Court 
held in Zant that merely labeling an aggravating 
circumstance as "statutory" may cause a jury to give 
somewhat greater weight to that factor during the selection 
stage than otherwise would be the case, it recognized that 
that circumstance may have an "inconsequential" impact 
on the verdict. Id. at 888-89, 103 S.Ct. at 2749. As we 
previously noted, the instructions did not suggest to the 
jury that it should place any greater emphasis on the 
statutory aggravating circumstances during the selection 
stage. 
 
Moreover, unlike the situation in Zant and Flamer where 
the aggravating circumstances were invalid because they 
were too vague to channel a sentencer's discretion in a 
capital case, the challenge here is that the jury was 
permitted to consider the same factor twice. Yet the court 
obviously mitigated the effect of that double consideration 
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because it instructed the jury that "[i]n weighing the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it is not a 
question of mere numbers of each, but rather the relative 
weight of each as compared to the others." App. at 116. 
Thus, this was not a case in which the jury could have 
made its recommendation merely because it determined 
that there were three rather than two aggravating factors. 
Accordingly, it is perfectly clear that consideration of both 
the robbery and pecuniary gain factors did not result in an 
arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty. 
Overall, we cannot possibly find an Eighth Amendment 
duplicative aggravating circumstances violation here even 
though our determination of the issue is predicated on our 
exercise of independent judgment. 
 
Finally, we point out that it is highly significant that the 
jury's finding was only a recommendation that the court 
was obliged to consider but ultimately could reject. As we 
previously explained, the court regarded the robbery and 
pecuniary gain aggravators as one factor. In the 
circumstances, we conclude that Ferguson was not 
prejudiced by the jury's finding that the two factors were 
separate. After all, the jury's consideration of the factors as 
discrete could have made a difference in the sentence 
imposed only if the jury would have recommended a 
sentence of life imprisonment if it considered the robbery 
and pecuniary gain factors as singular, and the court would 
have followed its recommendation. We think that such a 
scenario is far-fetched in view of the court's findings. 
Accordingly, even if there was error in the jury considering 
the pecuniary gain and robbery factors as separate 
aggravating factors, the error was harmless under any 
standard against which it could be considered no matter 
how exacting. 
 
In recognition that the Delaware Supreme Court 
considered Ferguson's duplicative aggravating 
circumstances claim on a plain error basis, see Ferguson, 
642 A.2d 781, the final issue we directed the parties to 
address in the certificate of appealability related to the 
possibility of there being an independent and adequate 
state ground barring federal review because of a procedural 
default in the state courts. Our disposition on the merits of 
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the duplicative aggravating circumstances claim makes it 
unnecessary for us to consider the procedural default 
issue, particularly inasmuch as the Delaware Supreme 
Court, in rejecting the duplicative aggravating 
circumstances claim on the merits, did not suggest that its 
result might have been different if it did not regard the 
matter as being before it on a plain error basis. See 
Ferguson, 642 A.2d at 781-83. Thus, although 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(b)(2), which provides that "[a]n application for a writ 
of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, 
notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the 
remedies available in the courts of the State," is not in 
terms applicable to procedural defaults we see no reason 
why we should not act consistently with that section when 
there is a possible procedural default. Of course, the 
procedural default issue differs from the exhaustion of state 
remedies issue which, notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(b)(2), we examined because we needed to parse the 
Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Ferguson to 
determine the effect of the AEDPA in this case. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court 
of December 13, 1996, denying habeas corpus relief will be 
affirmed. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I agree that Ferguson's claims must fail under AEDPA's 
deferential standard of review, and I therefore concur in the 
court's judgment. I write separately, however, because I 
disagree with several of the observations expressed in the 
majority opinion. 
 
Our review here is narrowly confined by 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(d)(1). Affording the deference required by that 
statute, I agree that the Delaware courts decided 
Ferguson's ex post facto claim in a manner that is neither 
"contrary to," nor "an unreasonable application of," the 
analysis required under the Supreme Court case law 
discussed in section II B of the majority opinion. See Maj. 
Op. at 13-27.1 However, my colleagues do not stop there. 
Rather, they opine: "we would have reached the result we 
do even if we exercised independent judgment in the way 
required before the adoption of the AEDPA." Maj. Op. at 32. 
That statement is, of course, pure dictum, and I strongly 
disagree with it. 
 
This case is governed by AEDPA, and there is no reason 
to hypothesize a de novo review of Ferguson's ex post facto 
claim. Furthermore, I do not agree that Ferguson's claim 
would necessarily fail if we were permitted to afford it 
independent review. At the very least, resolution of 
Ferguson's ex post facto claim presents an issue over which 
reasonable minds can differ, and therefore resolution of the 
issue is not nearly as clear as the majority suggests. 
Indeed, it is solely because "reasonable" minds can differ on 
this very close call that Ferguson's claim fails on habeas 
review of the state court ruling. Under AEDPA, we must 
defer to "reasonable" state court decisions even though, in 
our independent judgment, they are wrong. "Section 
2254(d) requires us to give state courts' opinions a 
respectful reading, and to listen carefully to their 
conclusions, but when the state court addresses a legal 
question, it is the law as determined by the Supreme Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I agree with my colleagues that the Supreme Court's most recent case 
of Carmwell v. Texas, 2000 WL 504585 (U.S. May 1, 2000), is not 
implicated here given the arguments that Ferguson is making in his 
appeal. See Maj. Op. at 24-25. 
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of the United States that prevails." Williams v. Taylor, ___ 
U.S. ___, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2000 WL 385369, *24 (U.S. Apr. 18, 
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). This analytical 
paradox is endemic to an analysis under AEDPA, but the 
key to resolving it here is the deference that the Supreme 
Court has instructed us to afford the decision of the 
Delaware Supreme Court.2 
 
In Williams , the Supreme Court confronted the enigmatic 
language of S 2254(d)(1). Writing for the majority, Justice 
O'Connor amplified the meaning of AEDPA's requirement 
that a state court decision be "contrary to," or involve "an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States." The "contrary to" clause, the Court explained, 
permits a federal habeas court to grant relief for a 
constitutional violation in two scenarios: (1) when"the state 
court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set 
forth in [Supreme Court] cases"; or (2) when "the state 
court confronts a set of facts that are materially 
indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court 
and nevertheless arrives at a result different from[Supreme 
Court] precedent." Id. at *24. "[I]n either of these two 
scenarios, a federal court will be unconstrained by 
S 2254(d)(1) because the state-court decision falls within 
that provision's `contrary to' clause." Id. The Court 
cautioned, however, that "a run-of-the-mill state-court 
decision applying the correct legal rule from [Supreme 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The tension inherent in this paradox is illustrated in the Court's 
observation that: 
 
       When federal judges exercise their federal-question jurisdiction 
       under the judicial power of Article III of the Constitution, it is 
       emphatically the province and duty of those judges to say what the 
       law is. At the core of this power is the federal courts' 
independent 
       responsibility -- independent from its coequal branches in the 
       Federal Government, and independent from the separate authority 
       of the several states -- to interpret federal law. A construction 
of 
       AEDPA that would require the federal courts to cede this authority 
       to the courts of the States would be inconsistent with the practice 
       that federal judges have traditionally followed in discharging 
their 
       duties under Article III of the Constitution. 
 
Williams, 2000 WL 385369, at *9 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Court] cases to the facts of a prisoner's case would not fit 
comfortably within S 2254(d)(1)'s `contrary to' clause." Id. 
The Court cited as an example a case in which a state court 
properly considered an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim under the controlling precedent of Strickland v. 
Washington, explaining that, "[a]lthough the state-court 
decision may be contrary to the federal court's conception 
of how Strickland ought to be applied in that particular 
case, the decision is not `mutually opposed' to Strickland 
itself." Id. The Court noted that such cases are more 
appropriately reviewed solely for their "reasonableness." I 
believe that best describes our situation here, and we 
should therefore focus our inquiry on the reasonableness of 
the Delaware Supreme Court's decision.3  
 
The "unreasonable application" clause of S 2254(d)(1) 
likewise covers two scenarios: (1) when "the state court 
identifies the correct governing legal rule from[Supreme 
Court] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the 
particular state prisoner's case"; or (2) when"the state 
court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from 
[Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it 
should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that 
principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 
*25. This "reasonableness" inquiry is an "objective" one. See 
id. at *26. "[T]he most important point is that an 
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an 
incorrect application of federal law." Id.  at *27. Thus, "a 
federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because 
that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 
relevant state-court decision applied clearly established 
federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that 
application must also be unreasonable." Id.  However, the 
Court did not define the mercurial line that divides an 
"incorrect" from an "unreasonable" application of federal 
law. Rather, it simply noted that "an unreasonable 
application of federal law is different from an incorrect or 
erroneous application of federal law." Id.  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. However, this is not to suggest that an inquiry under either clause of 
AEDPA necessarily displaces an inquiry under the concomitant clause. 
We will often have to examine a state court decision under both clauses 
of AEDPA. 
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Applying the Williams framework here, the majority 
properly rejects Ferguson's ex post facto claim. The 
Delaware Supreme Court identified the relevant Supreme 
Court precedents, and it decided the merits of Ferguson's 
claim in a manner that was neither "mutually opposed" to 
those precedents, nor "unreasonable" in its application of 
them. However, this does not mean that the state court was 
correct in its application of federal law. 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court held that, 
 
       [g]iven the teaching in Dobbert, it is clear that the 
       changes effected by Delaware's new death penalty 
       statute are procedural. The revisions in the law, like 
       those in Dobbert, merely altered the method of 
       determining imposition of the death penalty. The 
       quantum of punishment for the crime of first-degree 
       murder in Delaware remains unchanged. 
 
Cohen, 604 A.2d at 853. The simplicity of that analysis is 
misleading, and it produces a conclusion that is incorrect, 
though not necessarily unreasonable. To be sure, 
Delaware's law "merely altered the methods employed in 
determining the punishment to be imposed" insofar as it 
reassigned the task of imposing sentence from the jury to 
the judge. But unlike the statute in Dobbert, Delaware's law 
so conflates procedure and substance that it obfuscates the 
distinction between the two. 
 
Under the new law, if a judge determines that 
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, he or she 
must impose the death penalty. The new procedure, 
therefore, mandates a substantively different outcome--the 
death sentence rather than life without parole -- when 
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors. One no 
longer has the discretion to impose life imprisonment when 
the aggravators weigh more heavily in the balance. 
Delaware therefore converted what had been only a 
discretionary maximum into a mandatory sentence when 
the aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating factors. As 
the majority quite correctly notes, the trial judge here 
observed at sentencing: 
 
       [U]nlike a jury under the old law, this Court, under the 
       new law, may consider only whether or not aggravating 
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       factors outweigh mitigating factors. The Court may not 
       in unfettered discretion refuse to impose a sentence of 
       death where aggravating factors are proven and found 
       to be of substantial weight and mitigating factors are 
       found to be of less weight. The Court may not consider, 
       in reaching its decision, mercy, societal concerns, 
       proportionality of the sentence to other sentences 
       imposed for Murder First Degree in other cases, or any 
       other issues not specifically pertaining to `the 
       particular circumstances or details of the offense[or] 
       . . . the character and propensities of the offender. . . .' 
       These factors most likely were considered by and may 
       have influenced the jury or individual jury members in 
       their decision under the prior statute to recommend or 
       fail to recommend death. Under that law, the jury 
       clearly acted as `the conscience of the community' and 
       could in its unfettered discretion recommend life as the 
       appropriate punishment for the crime and offender 
       even though it had found the aggravating factors to 
       outweigh the mitigating factors. 
 
Maj. Op. at 7 (quoting App. at 129-130). 
 
Thus, the "procedural change" wrought by the new law 
precludes a juror from exercising mercy in a given case, 
and mutes "the conscience of the community" in 
deliberations into whether a member of that community 
should be put to death. It is misleading to characterize 
such a fundamental change in the law as merely 
"procedural." I read Lindsey v. Washington  to stand for the 
proposition that such a change may well have increased the 
quantum of punishment for Ferguson's crime. 
 
The Delaware courts sought to distinguish Lindsey by 
citing the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence and holding that the new law is not 
"impermissibly mandatory." See Cohen, 604 A.2d at 855. 
But clearly, a determination that the new law is not 
"impermissibly mandatory" sidesteps the crucial question 
whether the new law "increased the quantum of 
punishment" for Ferguson's offense. The change in 
Delaware's law could not have eliminated discretion without 
violating the Eighth Amendment. See Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238 (1972). Thus, even if we assume that 
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Delaware's new law passes muster under the Eighth 
Amendment because it affords an individualized inquiry 
before sentence is imposed, that does not mean that 
retrospective application of that law to Ferguson's case did 
not make the death sentence "mandatory" by eliminating 
the discretion to impose a life sentence after  it was 
determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed 
mitigating circumstances. 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court also sought to distinguish 
Lindsey by ruling that a death sentence is not truly 
"mandatory" because the judge must assign a"relative 
weight" to the aggravating and mitigating factors before 
determining which sentence--life imprisonment or death-- 
is required by the new statute. The state court concluded 
that, given the presence of this "weighing process," "[t]he 
sentencing process remains basically discretionary, merely 
shifting the ultimate decision from the jury to the trial 
judge." Cohen, 604 A.2d at 855. The District Court agreed, 
stating that "[t]he sentencing decision has not been reduced 
to a mechanical exercise, as it was in Lindsey ." This 
"distinction" is irrelevant. 
 
While the new law required a "predicate" assessment of 
the relative weight of the sentencing evidence before the 
mandated sentence was imposed, that did not make the 
imposition of this death sentence any less mechanical. As 
noted, to survive scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, 
Delaware must allow for individualized findings of fact 
before the death sentence is imposed. See, e.g., Blystone, 
494 U.S. at 305. Thus, it is specious to distinguish Lindsey 
by asserting that, because the new law did not require 
imposition of a death sentence at the very moment 
Ferguson was convicted, the law somehow lost its 
"mandatory" and "mechanical" nature. In the context of 
capital punishment jurisprudence, it clearly did not. 
Rather, the Delaware law is the capital sentencing 
equivalent of the law deemed ex post facto in Lindsey. The 
dispositive issue in Lindsey was that a previously optional 
maximum became mandatory, not the procedural context 
in which that metamorphosis occurred. Thus, the state 
court's reliance upon what it perceived to be the difference 
between the statute in Lindsey ("the penalty for this offense 
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shall be fifteen years in prison") and the statute here ("if, at 
sentencing, the judge finds that the aggravating factors 
outweigh the mitigating factors, the sentence shall be 
death") does not further the inquiry. "Subtle ex post facto 
violations are no more permissible than overt ones." Collins, 
497 U.S. at 46. 
 
It is also obvious that Delaware's new law had exactly the 
intended result. Delaware enacted the new sentencing 
scheme to make it more difficult for convicted murderers to 
escape execution. The Delaware Supreme Court has noted 
that 
 
       the catalyst for the legislation changing the death 
       penalty statute was the imposition of life sentences on 
       defendants by a New Castle County jury in a much 
       publicized capital murder case involving the execution 
       style murders of two armored car guards. 
 
Cohen, 604 A.2d at 849. The reaction reflected the 
community's justifiable outrage over those murders. 
Ferguson contends that a vastly higher proportion of 
defendants have been sentenced to death under the new 
statute. He argues, therefore, that Lindsey prevents 
Delaware from applying the new statute to him. He asserts 
that of the 28 defendants who have been sentenced under 
the amended statute, 15 (more than 50%) have been 
sentenced to death. Of the 29 defendants sentenced under 
the old statute in the 6 years prior to the amendment, only 
1 (less than 4%) was sentenced to death.4  
 
The majority minimizes this argument in part by noting: 
 
       we must consider the increased imposition of the death 
       penalty against the circumstance that under the 
       amended law the court as opposed to a unanimous 
       jury must determine to impose a death penalty. Surely 
       it would be expected that, in light of that difference, 
       there would have been more sentences of death. 
 
Maj. Op. at 33 (emphasis added). The majority cites no 
authority for this speculation, and I submit that it is at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The state disputes this latter figure, stating that 10 defendants were 
sentenced to death under the previous statute. 
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least as likely (indeed more so) that this change would, by 
itself, reduce the number of death sentences. After all, one 
can safely assume that trained jurists are less likely to 
allow the emotions that so often percolate into the fabric of 
death penalty proceedings to impact their judgments about 
the cases that are submitted to death qualified juries. 
Moreover, there is a significant school of thought that a 
jury that has been "death qualified" is more prone to 
convict, and one might argue more prone to impose the 
death penalty, than a jury composed of persons opposed to 
the death penalty. See Witt v. Wainwright, 470 U.S. 1039 
(1985) (and cases cited therein). Finally, I think it fair to 
assume that a trained jurist who has been exposed to 
numerous homicide cases has a better frame of reference 
than a lay jury, and therefore less likely to be as outraged 
about a given homicide as lay jurors who have never seen 
a homicide, or a convicted killer, "up close and personal." 
Accordingly, the trained jurist may often be far less likely to 
assume that the ultimate sanction is required in a given 
case. 
 
I think it is obvious that the new statute is significantly 
more likely to result in the death penalty than the statute 
in effect at the time of Ferguson's crime. However, as the 
majority correctly notes, that does not necessarily implicate 
the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 
U.S. 37 (1990). However, that clause would be implicated 
under the aforementioned Lindsey analysis under de novo 
review, and I believe that Delaware's retrospective 
application of the challenged statute to Ferguson's case 
would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause under Lindsey. 
 
That said, I am constrained, nevertheless, to agree with 
my colleagues that the state court's treatment of Lindsey 
and the other Supreme Court precedents must be upheld in 
light of S 2254(d)(1)'s mandate. Under the"contrary to" 
clause, the Delaware Supreme Court cited and applied the 
correct law. To paraphrase Williams, while I believe the 
state court decision does not square with my "conception of 
how [Lindsey] ought to be applied in th[is] particular case, 
the decision is not `mutually opposed' to [ Lindsey] itself." 
Williams, 2000 WL 385369, at *24. Nor is it unreasonable 
to hold that Delaware's new law limited the factors that 
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could be considered before sentence was imposed upon 
Ferguson, and still conclude that the law did not eliminate 
all discretion from the sentencing process. As the majority 
explains, that is something that Lindsey (and subsequent 
Supreme Court precedent) can be fairly said to require for 
a law to contravene the ex post facto prohibition. 
 
Nor can I conclude that the Delaware Supreme Court was 
"objectively unreasonable" (as opposed to"incorrect") in its 
application of, or "refusal to extend," clearly established 
federal law to the facts of Ferguson's case. Thus, while I 
concur in the Court's judgment, I do so solely because I 
agree that the result we reach is required under AEDPA. 
 
I also agree that Ferguson's challenge to the duplicative 
nature of the aggravating factors must fail, but for reasons 
that I must distinguish from the analysis of my colleagues. 
I believe Ferguson's "double counting of aggravating factors" 
claim fails solely because the trial judge in this case stated 
that he counted the robbery and pecuniary gain 
circumstances as one factor during the weighing process. 
The record is clear that the judge placed "no independent 
weight" on the pecuniary gain aggravator. It was the judge's 
assessment of the sentencing factors, not the jury's, that 
sealed Ferguson's fate. Thus, regardless of the merits of 
Ferguson's Eighth Amendment claim in the abstract, it is 
clear that the jury's consideration of the two circumstances 
(though problematic) had no bearing on his sentence, and 
Ferguson can show no prejudice as a result. Nevertheless, 
I think Ferguson's argument as to the alleged "double 
counting" is much stronger than the majority suggests, and 
I do not join the majority's lengthy discussion of the merits 
of this claim. I do, however, join the majority's conclusion 
that the record does not support the Delaware Supreme 
Court's resolution of the claim, and the majority's 
conclusion that Ferguson was not prejudiced by double 
counting because the sentencing judge didn't double count. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I concur in 
the judgment of my colleagues. 
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